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Socio-political processes in international management in post-
socialist contexts: knowledge, learning and transnational institution 
building 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to the recent debates and emerging concepts in the international 
business literature by applying a social-institutionalist perspective that focuses on the 
processes of institution building in ventures between Western multinational corporations and 
post-socialist enterprises. It is argued that the knowledge and learning processes within these 
transnational sites are constitutive of the actual management and organizational practices that 
emerge in these social microcosms of transformation. In transition and other emerging 
economic contexts, international ventures are typically based on asymmetrical relationships, in 
which the balance of power is structurally weighted in favor of the MNC. Notwithstanding 
this dominance structure, constructing new practices within the transnational social space is a 
socio-political process involving power-holders such as senior managers representing the 
Western MNC and the local enterprise. The paper argues that the strategic orientations of these 
key power holders are critical variables in explaining the diversity of concrete patterns of 
institution building on transnational sites. 
 
Keywords: Socio-political processes; Management learning; Transnational institution 
building; Multinational corporations; Transition and emerging economies 
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Socio-political processes in international management in post-
socialist contexts: knowledge, learning and transnational institution 
building  
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this exploratory paper is to develop a conceptual framework that improves 
our understanding how ventures between indigenous post-socialist enterprises 
(especially former state-owned enterprises, or SOEs) and Western multinational 
companies (MNCs) are institutionally constructed within the wider context of the 
post-socialist transformation. It focuses specifically on processes of knowledge 
acquisition and learning within such international ventures (IVs), which include both 
joint-venture and headquarters-subsidiary forms of organization in which Western 
MNCs develop international operations. The arguments build on concepts derived 
from recent developments in the international business literature and seek to 
contribute back to this field new ways of thinking about the socio-political 
dimensions of cross-cultural management. 
 
Theoretically, we build our arguments from an institutionalist conceptualization of the 
post-socialism as socio-economic transformation (Child and Czeglédy, 1996; Clark 
and Soulsby, 1999; McDermott, 1997; also Stark, 1992, 1997; Whitley, 1995; 
Whitley and Czaban, 1998), which recognizes that post-socialism has proven to be 
more complex, convoluted and diverse than was first thought by the transition 
economists. Far from replicating an imported ‘design’ of market capitalism, the 
institutionalization of new microeconomic practices of management and business has 
been uneven between and within post-socialist societies, across and within industrial 
sectors. In this paper, we argue that important features of the post-socialist 
transformation have evolved through a process of institution building, socially 
constructed from the bottom up by economic actors working within structures of 
international business. 
 
The paper draws on recent conceptual developments around the idea of ‘transnational 
social space’ (Morgan et al., 2001; Pries, 2001) to examine microeconomic institution 
building in IVs. Institution building takes place as transnational social spaces are 
‘filled’ with new structures and practices, which in turn reflect processes of 
4 
 4 
knowledge acquisition and learning that change the nature of existing management 
and organization. As this process is repeated and new practices legitimized within and 
across industrial sectors, they take on an institutionalized form beyond the original 
site. 
 
Detailed studies of transnational sites in post-socialist countries and elsewhere have 
shown that knowledge processes are more complex and less linear than the one-way 
transfer and consensual learning implied by low context, transition-economic 
perspectives (Child, 2000a; Clark and Geppert, 2002). Indeed, there are indications 
that international MNC operations may be more typically characterized by degrees of 
conflict and disagreement between Western knowledge (and its agents) and local 
practices (and their practitioners), with important implications for the process and 
outcomes of institution building at both micro and macro levels. However, the socio-
political underpinnings of these processes have not been systematically analyzed and 
are rarely discussed.  
 
Transnational institution building in post-socialist settings takes place within 
asymmetrical relationships, in which the balance of power is structurally weighted in 
favor of the MNC. Nonetheless, the central thrust of our argument is that the 
transnational social space becomes institutionalized through political processes that 
involve significant power-holders – notably those representing the Western ‘source’ 
MNC and the local ‘recipient’ enterprise. Potential political contestation makes 
institution building a genuinely open empirical question, not to be foreclosed by 
structuralist assumptions and ‘generalized predictive models’ (Child, 2002, p. 782). In 
other words, the differential expectations and priorities of the power-holders – 
influenced by their knowledge strategies, contributions and needs – lead to different 
processes and outcomes in the structuring and management of transnational social 
spaces. 
 
The paper unfolds in the following way. First, we elaborate the argument for seeing 
the post-socialist transformation as an emergent process of institution building, which 
can be theorized as a social and political construction involving human agents at the 
micro-level of the international venture. Then, we examine the concept of a 
transnational social space, which provides the key locus within which knowledge and 
learning processes take place. Third, the paper examines a defining characteristic of 
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transnational alliances in transforming countries, the systematic asymmetry of 
relationships, which leads to a section exploring the variability of partners’ strategic 
and management orientations towards IVs. These conceptual building blocks are 
brought together in the fifth section to consider three illustrative, ideal-typical cases of 
institution building in transnational social spaces, before drawing some conclusions 
and suggesting directions for further research. 
 
2. Microeconomic transformation and the post-socialist context 
Inspired by neo-classical economics, the study of post-socialism as economic 
transition has been an influential approach with strong policy implications. At its 
logical extreme, the transition approach conceptualizes post-socialist change as a 
designable shift from one stylized system of command economy to another of free 
market capitalism, taking an idealized form of simultaneous and frictionless 
demolition of the first system and construction of market economic institutions. 
Within this transition model, knowledge transfer and learning tend to be portrayed 
(often implicitly) as mimetic processes. Knowledge movements are a one-way 
transmission from Western models to post-socialism, while learning takes place 
passively and without reflection (Child and Czeglédy, 1996; Clark and Geppert, 
2002). 
 
It is generally agreed that foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the most 
influential mechanisms for effecting microeconomic institution building, because of 
its ability to permeate Western knowledge throughout transforming societies (Crone 
and Roper, 2001). This theoretical view posits a number of structural links: the 
infusion of foreign capital leads to the transfer of critical Western knowledge to post-
socialist partners, who practise the know-how and, through their supplier and client 
networks, cascade their learning locally. Child (2000a) refers to such structural views 
of knowledge transfer and management learning as ‘low context’, because they tend 
to ignore the relevance of local factors to emerging business practices by emphasizing 
forms of economic, technological and/or psychological universalism. Criticized as 
mechanistic, shallow and de-contextualized (Djelic and Quack, 2002; Griffith et al., 
2001), this concept of ‘transfer’ tends to ignore empirical counter-evidence that, for 
example, foreign ownership does not always effect the necessary changes in 
management and organization (Pollert, 1999), and may even bow in significant ways 
to local practices (Whitley and Czaban, 1998). 
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The alternative view starts from the observation that changes in institutional systems 
are always conditioned – mediated, restrained or opposed – by the path dependencies, 
because historical legacies that are built into local custom and practice are an 
important friction on transformation (Stark, 1992). In practice, the path adopted by 
any particular society depends on the responses of social actors in micro-level social 
arenas such as work organizations. Societal transformation is therefore an aggregated 
process, socially constructed by motivated human agents operating in all spheres of 
society. From this bottom-up perspective, the research problem is to discover and 
explain the variety of patterns in the many micro-social processes of institution 
building, rather than proposing some generic or universal formula. 
 
Societal transformation can be understood as a socially constructed process, which 
involves the acquisition of new or different ways of thinking and behaving, leading to 
changes in social practice that, when repeated and habitualized, are the bases of new 
institutionalized practices. Faced with the problems and conundrums of operating in a 
changing business context, post-socialist managers have to develop what Whittington 
(2002) calls ‘contextualised savoir-faire’. Like a bricoleur, they have to put together 
new sets of practices (micro-institutions) from the social, cultural and economic 
resources available – that is, some sense of transformational order is constructed from 
historical and contemporary bits and pieces (e.g. Djelic and Quack, 2002; Grabher 
and Stark, 1997; Weik, 2001). These institutional building blocks include both 
domestic and foreign knowledge, an issue largely discussed as ‘hybridization’ in the 
international management literature (Abo, 1994; Boyer et al., 1998) but rarely 
conceptualized in more actor-centered terms. 
 
Such ‘high context’ approaches (Child, 2000a) examine the processes of cross border 
knowledge transfer and learning in their cultural and contextualized complexity, for 
example, through case study methods. Instead of the smoothed-out linear copying of 
Western institutions, high context research has tended to uncover contradictions, 
conflicts and resistance within relationships between foreign and local partners, 
reinforcing the lessons of international business research – that cross border 
knowledge transfer is characterized by ‘stickiness’ (Szulanski, 1996), politics (Yan 
and Gray, 1994), instabilities (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Shenkar and Yan, 2002) 
and ‘absorptive’ incapacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
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3. Structuring the transnational social space 
The microeconomic institution building that takes place within IVs is therefore the 
consequence of the structural and political relationships between the partners and 
other significant power holders. The concept of a transnational social space (Clark 
and Geppert, 2002; Morgan, 2001) describes the organizational site created by 
strategic partners, whose combined socio-political acts of imposition, resistance and 
negotiation serve to structure the space through the emergence of institutionalized 
practices.  
 
The general characteristics of a transnational social space include its cultural and 
institutional contexts; the initial ‘negotiated bargain’ that establishes the formal rules 
of the game (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997); the resources contributed to the venture, 
including different types of knowledge (Bhagat et al., 2002; Yan and Gray, 1994); the 
motives, values and orientations of the partners (Koza and Lewin, 1998), their 
secondees (Pearce, 2001) and independent managers (Shenkar and Yan, 2002); and 
the socio-political processes that constitute the venture on a day-to-day basis (Inkpen 
and Beamish, 1997; Shenkar and Yan, 2002). 
 
In principle, the institutions that are built in the transnational social space result from 
the balance of three knowledge processes. First, direct importation introduces new 
Western knowledge and practices from the outside, to be inscribed on-site relatively 
intact. Second, recombination reproduces knowledge and resources inherited from 
local history (Stark, 1997) and presents in a new pattern of social bricolage. Third, 
knowledge can be indirect assimilated as new external ideas are filtered through post-
socialist values and integrated into the local knowledge base. This last process may 
reflect degrees of conflict between different social logics (Djelic and Quack, 2002; 
Pries, 2001). Since the melding of these knowledge flows into evolving 
microeconomic institutions is necessarily mediated through human agency, their 
precise institutional outcomes are unknowable from a generalizing structural theory.  
Instead, we need to develop a more context-sensitive and actor-centered theoretical 
framework. It is to this task that we now turn. 
 
4. Structural asymmetries in Western/post-socialist ventures 
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Some degree of relationship asymmetry is built into any strategic alliance (Hamel, 
1991; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Mowery et al., 1996; Yan and Gray, 1994), but 
structural asymmetries are an even more significant feature of international ventures 
involving Western MNCs in transforming economies because of the influence of 
contextual asymmetries. 
 
Relationship asymmetry between partners arises because of inequalities that are 
intrinsic to the initial contract or bargain: the contracts, rules and arrangements that 
define the nature of the venture; equity shares; the balance of senior management 
and/or the rights of the partners in strategic control and decisions (Inkpen and 
Beamish, 1997). The initial bargain, with its formal characteristics and informal 
understandings, establishes the structural distribution of power, within which takes 
place the subsequent shaping of the transnational social space. In practice, any 
strategic alliance bargain is likely to have asymmetrical features, but there is also 
likely to be some kind of balancing of partners’ contributions and objectives – for 
example, one party may contribute more finance while another more know-how. 
 
Inequalities in economic power, resulting from differential equity stakes, are typical 
of IVs in post-socialist economies, because of the weak capital position of local 
enterprises and of the state. Research indicates a negative relationship between equity 
imbalance – and related control asymmetries – and the performance or longevity of 
ventures (Salk and Shenkar, 2001). In their study of Western-Hungarian IJVs, Danis 
and Parkhe (2002) found an incipient instability that resulted from the local partner’s 
high capital dependence on the Western MNC. 
 
Typically there are also asymmetries in knowledge and other non-capital 
contributions by the partners. Thus, foreign partners tend to provide technology, 
general and specialized management expertise and global support, while local firms 
offer market/client information, local labor and distribution system (Inkpen and 
Beamish, 1997; Yan and Gray, 1994). It has been argued that foreign knowledge 
tends to be strongly embedded or ‘system-dependent’ (Bhagat et al., 2002; Eisenhardt 
and Santos, 2002), while local knowledge tends to be more easily codifiable or of 
limited use (Danis and Parkhe, 2002; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). From the start, 
therefore, the more tacit and complex Western contributions are far more difficult to 
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‘translate’ – to ‘dis-embed’, move around and learn (to re-embed and to 
institutionalize) – than is local knowledge (see Dobosz and Jankowicz, 2002). 
 
In a symmetrical relationship, partners enter into alliances with knowledge needs that 
are different but probably balanced and equitable. In Western/post-socialist ventures, 
however, knowledge needs tend to be highly asymmetrical, because of systematic 
knowledge gaps that are typical of former SOEs (Griffith et al., 2001; Si and Bruton, 
1999). While local partners need Western management expertise in order to survive, 
foreign partners see local knowledge – including cultural and language – as relatively 
insignificant in strategic terms, creating a balance of dependency of the local on the 
foreign partner.  
 
These inequalities become reproduced in asymmetries in management discourse and 
reputation. In the global management sphere, post-socialist managers have weak 
claims to legitimacy and one of their aims in international collaboration is to seek the 
legitimacy of full ‘membership’ of the Western management community of practice 
(Clark and Soulsby, 1999; Merkens et al., 2001). While they remain ‘peripheral 
participants’ (Brown and Duguid, 1991), they have a strong incentive to ‘learn’ 
enough to become accepted as peers. This requires gaining knowledge about how to 
speak ‘modern management’, a problem not faced by Western managers. 
 
These and other asymmetries are structured into the transnational social space as 
formal and informal elements of the relationship between local and Western 
management. They serve to create structures of dependency and domination that 
systematically predispose the relationship in the Western partner’s favor (Hardy and 
Clegg, 1999). However, they are more ‘normal’ in alliances between Western and 
post-socialist companies because they exist within a ‘formative context’ (Child, 2002) 
that gives such ventures another structural layer of asymmetry. The political and 
economic frailties of former communist countries create a strong dependence on 
advanced Western countries for aid and loans in order to restructure. Moreover, the 
image has prevailed that, in the wake of the ‘victory’ of capitalism, post-communist 
managers possessed ‘worthless’ knowledge (Geppert and Merkens, 1999). It was such 
an image – and the sense that they were ‘begging’ and desperate – that led many 
enterprises into a headlong pursuit of foreign capital. These contextual asymmetries 
provided a significant backcloth against which multinationals negotiated their initial 
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bargains with SOEs. On the other hand, whenever the state has been an active 
economic and institutional player, it has been able an important counterweight in 
negotiating relationships between local plants and MNCs (Dörr and Kessel, 2002; also 
Child, 2002; Shenkar and Yan, 2002). 
 
Given this structure of domination, it is easier for the foreign partner to mine local 
knowledge, protect its own knowledge and, through a politics of increasing 
asymmetry, decrease its dependence on the local partner. Thus Hamel (1991) 
proposes that strategic alliances are competitions for competence, in which each 
partner seeks to ‘outlearn’ the other in order to gain strategic advantage. Inkpen and 
Beamish (1997) develop this idea further, arguing that the politics of strategic alliance 
lead to a precarious balance and an incipient state of instability within the 
transnational space. This political process involves maneuvers by each party to reduce 
its dependency on the other by acquiring the latter’s unique knowledge, while 
protecting its own knowledge by making it difficult to acquire.  
 
Yet these arguments about inter-partner politics are predicated on a particular view of 
international ventures, which presumes a certain set of MNC values and priorities and 
a certain set of local management responses. For example, privileging an Anglo-
American type of strategic instrumentalism downplays the importance of trust and 
long-term relations in IVs (contrast Hagen and Choe, 1998). In fact, even ignoring 
national cultural variations, foreign partners can make choices about knowledge 
exchange, in extreme cases opting to either maintain exclusive control or share even 
the tacit foundations of management knowledge. Similarly, local partners can choose 
to reproduce local practices and minimize ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990) or cede local influence to Western practices (Wang et al., 2001; Yan 
and Child, 2002). 
 
In summary, relationship and contextual asymmetries within a Western-post-socialist 
IV shape a framework that privileges MNC’s ability to structure the transnational 
social space according to its managers’ strategic priorities. However, in order to 
understand the empirical diversity of institution building on transnational sites, we 
need to know more about the goals and interests of both foreign and local partners and 
the human agents who represent them. 
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5. Partner orientations and responses to structural asymmetry 
The characteristics of the two partners and the relationship between them affect their 
capacity and willingness to ‘teach’ and ‘learn’ (Wang et al., 2001) within the 
transnational site. Given the structural asymmetries, Western managers’ strategic 
values and priorities (i.e. their orientations) and subsequent actions are especially 
significant in setting the organizational climate in which knowledge can be 
transferred, absorbed, rejected and so on. It is nonetheless an error to ignore the 
orientations and actions of post-socialist managers (Dörr and Kessel, 2002). To 
explore the theoretical possibilities of these ideas, we conceptualize local and foreign 
managers’ orientations in a simplified way, neglecting the actual content of the values 
and concentrating on the postures that powerful actors adopt toward the venture. 
 
5.1. Local orientations to foreign collaboration 
Faced with the need for deep restructuring in order to adapt to changing market-
economic pressures, post-socialist enterprise management has adopted one or more of 
several strategies. Some, for example, have insisted in ‘going it alone’ or with existing 
domestic partners, demonstrating high levels of resistance to foreign ideas and control 
– the international business literature has sometimes referred to a ‘not invented here’ 
syndrome as one indicator of recipient reluctance (Szulanski, 1996). Some post-
socialist research has found assertions of enterprise autonomy, sometimes expressed 
as national pride in the face of the ‘arrogance’ of Western knowledge (Clark and 
Soulsby, 1999; Markóczy, 1993; Simon and Davies, 1996). By rejecting the loss of 
domestic control embodied in FDI proposals, such enterprises effectively proclaim 
their own cultural resources and ability to survive through recombining existing 
knowledge. 
 
Another response has been to maintain strategic independence but, in recognition of 
the need to acquire Western concepts and techniques, to import foreign ideas through 
recruitment, training or educational policies (Hollinshead and Michailova, 2001; 
Soulsby and Clark, 1996). The spread of MBA courses and international training 
courses in Central Europe, for example, owes much to local managers’ desire to learn 
foreign practice, while retaining indigenous control and independence. Many post-
socialist enterprises have, however, entered into alliances with foreign firms as the 
preferred way of updating technology, acquiring capital or gaining access to existing 
global networks or supply chains. Acquisition of knowledge is often cited as a major 
12 
 12 
reason for smaller firms entering strategic alliances with more powerful Western 
MNCs (Griffith et al., 2001; Si and Bruton, 1999). Geppert and Merkens (1999) found 
strong local enthusiasm for acquiring new ideas and practices from the West. On the 
other hand, given the generally penurious state of post-socialist enterprises and a 
sense of being forced into foreign alliances despite preferences for autonomy, it is not 
possible to take enthusiasm, passive acceptance or even indifference for granted 
(Uhlenbruck and de Castro, 2000). 
 
In terms of management and organizational learning and resultant institution building, 
it is crucial to know the degree of voluntarism with which local managers enter into a 
venture. National and professional identity can have significant effects on patterns of 
willingness and acceptance shown by Czech (Clark and Soulsby, 1999), Bulgarian 
(Hollinshead and Michailova, 2001) and Hungarian managers (Simon and Davies, 
1996; Markóczy, 1993) in their relationships with Western managers. Senior local 
managers can sign a contract with a Western partner because they have to, not 
because they want to - this can have serious ramifications for the acquisition of new 
practices and the development of new institutions.  
 
In short, there is evidence that the orientations of post-socialist managers vary quite 
significantly, between positive and negative attitudes to Western knowledge, and in 
the willingness to learn ideas and practices that are ‘imposed’ from outside. 
Knowledge can be adopted actively through consensual engagement or passively 
through a sense of expedient necessity. Similarly, local managers can use their power 
to reject or undermine knowledge through passive or active resistance. Non-
compliance can even take an unwitting apolitical form, as when cultural or linguistic 
barriers impede or distort levels of communication between Western and local 
managers (Simon and Davies, 1996; Spicer, 1997; Villinger, 1996). This discussion 
brings us to our first proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: As a result of their diverse historical and contemporaneous 
experiences of business, local partners in a Western-post-socialist IV vary in their 
degrees of involvement (activity or passivity) in and support (positive or negative) for 
transnational institution building. 
 
5.2. Western orientations to local management 
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The ways in which senior Western managers approach issues of knowledge transfer 
and institution building reflect the strategic orientations, through which they attribute 
value and meaning to foreign ventures. The logics of action implied by strategic 
orientations vary significantly in content according the country of origin 
(Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2003). Thus, far from being a general theory of 
international business behaviour, the politics of instability elucidated so eloquently by 
Inkpen and Beamish (1997) may enact strategic preferences typically associated with 
Anglo-American MNCs. On the other hand, cultural concepts of trust found 
elsewhere, for example in some Asian communities, might make this political logic 
quite untenable (Sullivan et al., 1981). While noting this potentially wide spectrum of 
Western strategic orientations, our discussion is limited two ideal typical forms drawn 
from the international business literature: ethnocentrism-exploitation and 
polycentrism-exploration. 
 
Following Perlmutter (1969), an ethnocentric strategic orientation emphasizes the 
Western managers’ preferences for the norms and standards that prevail in their own 
country, which in turn encourages one way and top-down processes of transferring 
knowledge from the home to the host country. Orders, commands and advice from 
home country managers (Perlmutter, 1969) therefore dominate the communication 
process between Western head office and its foreign operations. Implicitly, 
ethnocentric Western managers presume the superiority of their own ideas and 
priorities and act to impose their knowledge and learning practices on local managers 
and employees. Such a strategic approach is more or less directly focused on 
‘outflanking’ local resistance (Clegg, 1994). 
 
The cultural superiority implicit in an MNC’s ethnocentrism is logically related to 
what Koza and Lewin (1998), following March (1991), refer to as an exploitative 
approach to organizational learning. Thus, where a Western partner adopts an 
exploitation strategy, such as cost leadership, short-term access to local markets and 
cheap labour and other resources (Porter, 1985), it would have little interest in the 
knowledge and specific competences of post-socialist partners. Overall, the 
ethnocentric-exploitation strategic orientation leads to the imposition of minimally 
necessary external and explicit knowledge, while keeping secure the tacit or system 
dependent foundations of such knowledge. This orientation may be echoed in and a 
reflection of the low level of inter-partner trust (Johnson et al., 1996) and the type of 
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venture created, such as a highly rationalized operation servicing global corporation 
needs and creating little local value (Crone and Roper, 2002). 
 
We can contrast ethnocentrism-exploitation as a type with that of polycentrism-
exploration. In this context, we use ‘polycentric’ generically as a polar opposite of 
ethnocentric, while recognizing that this neglects the finesse of Perlmutter’s (1969) 
distinction between polycentrism and geocentrism. A polycentric orientation places 
greater emphasis on the legitimacy and expression of host country values, with local 
managers having a greater say in alliance affairs and local identity given precedence 
over head office culture. Greater awareness of local values, experiences and practices 
increases the potential for longer-term trust and symmetrical cooperation between 
Western and local partners. In turn, it is conducive to the realisation of strategies that 
go beyond straightforward cost leadership to focus on a differentiation (Porter, 1985). 
Polycentrism encourages the incorporation of local knowledge in decision-making 
and the enhancement of two-way learning. This orientation goes hand in hand with a 
more participatory approach to institution building (Bachrach and Botwinick, 1992).  
 
The cultural sensitivity to and political acknowledgement of local management has a 
logical association with what March (1991) calls exploratory learning, a process 
through which new opportunities – rather than extension of existing capabilities – can 
be discovered. Other things being equal, a polycentric-exploratory orientation is more 
likely to promote a climate in which knowledge can be freely exchanged and mutual 
understandings negotiated between Western and local partners (Koza and Lewin, 
1998). In sharing deeper tacit knowledge from both Western and local contexts, the 
transnational site is likely to be infused with genuinely new practices (Child, 2000b).  
 
These observations suggest the following two propositions: 
 
Proposition 2a: Other things being equal, in a Western- post-socialist IV where the 
Western partner holds an ethnocentric-exploitative strategic orientation, management 
will seek one way transfer of explicit Western knowledge, encourage minimum local 
partner involvement and learning, and show less commitment to the transnational 
venture. 
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Proposition 2b: Other things being equal, in a Western post-socialist IV where the 
Western partner holds a polycentric-explorative strategic orientation, management 
will seek to exchange deep tacit knowledge, encourage real local partner involvement 
and learning and show greater commitment to the transnational alliance. 
 
5.3. Combining Western and local orientations 
We argue that, despite the structure of domination on the asymmetric transnational 
site, knowledge, learning and institution building processes depend on the interaction 
between MNC and local agents. Table 1 provides an overview of the eight 
combinations that arise from the analysis above, and some combinations suggest more 
congruence than others. 
 
---------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
For example, it would appear on a priori grounds that levels of acceptance are more 
likely to be associated with exploratory (cases 1 and 2) than exploitative strategic 
values (cases 5 and 6). Similarly, one might expect an exploitative posture to be met 
with some level of hostility or opposition (cases 7 and 8). In fact, the incidence of 
these combinations is an empirical question, for reasons we have already introduced 
e.g. some post-socialist managers have welcomed any kind of foreign intervention 
with open arms, because it satisfies some value other than sustaining domestic 
management control (e.g. protecting employment). We now examine the implications 
of some of these combinations. 
 
6. Knowledge, learning and institution building in asymmetric transnational sites 
Underlying the notion of a transnational social space is the expectation that the nature 
of organization and management in an IV demands the resolution of objectives and 
interests that are often grounded in quite diverse logics of action, opening up 
questions about ‘the dynamism, conflict and change that occurs inside multinationals’ 
(Morgan, 2001, p. 11). Even within a transnational space characterized by systematic 
asymmetries, social actors are at the center of the knowledge and learning processes. 
Within the internal socio-political processes of the IV, the motivated pursuit of 
interests and strategies effectively establishes the degree to which the emergent 
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venture mimics the dominant partner – reproducing structural asymmetries – resists it 
or takes on new combinations of organizational elements. The logic of this argument 
is presented in Figure 1. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
We examine this general theoretical framework by following through the implications 
of three of the eight ideal typical combinations (see Table 1). These cases have been 
selected to illustrate important features of the general framework outlined above, and 
the main characteristics of the remaining cases are outlined in Table 2. For example, 
cases 1 and 6, in different ways, demonstrate the importance of understanding 
different degrees of local management commitment in explaining knowledge and 
learning processes; on the other hand, cases 1 and 8 provide conceptually polar 
scenarios that theoretical probing of the framework. In outlining these scenarios, it is 
important to bear in mind the many variables that are held constant in order to 
construct theoretical propositions e.g. country of origin and post-socialist country of 
destination differences, different types of international venture (e.g. IJV or MNC-
subsidiary relationship) or type of industry. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
6.1. Case 1: Assimilative transnational order 
The first case concerns a polycentric-exploratory Western orientation with active local 
acceptance. The Western partner seeks to develop new ideas, products or markets by 
actively putting its knowledge resources together with those of the local partner. This 
is an approach that sets aside structural asymmetries in favor of negotiating a 
consensual pathway and a long-term relationship. Although local managers might 
adopt a positive and willing posture independently of this Western approach, the latter 
is certainly likely to reinforce high levels of acceptance (Child, 2002). 
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This scenario has strong implications for knowledge and learning within the 
transnational site. Although all three knowledge processes can be found within this 
scenario, it is especially oriented toward assimilative processes. Since the case 
generates trust through two-way commitment and collaborative relationships, both 
parties are willing to share tacit knowledge and hence encourage mutual, deep 
learning in the transnational site. As such, the transnational site is likely to develop a 
genuinely ‘third culture’ (Spicer, 1997) and a consequent high degree of transnational 
institutional order. 
 
In post-socialist Europe, this socio-political scenario has been more likely to evolve 
when the state has had some involvement, a situation which was indeed quite 
common in most former state socialist countries in the early stages of transition 
(Whitley, 1999). When the state joined the negotiation process as a powerful external 
stakeholder, it could, to some extent, act as a counterweight to structural asymmetry. 
The role of the Czech State was clear, for example, in the initial bargain between 
Škoda and Volkswagen, preventing Škoda becoming merely another low-cost labor 
site, with solely operational responsibilities (Dörr and Kessel, 2002). 
 
However, Dörrenbächer (2002) found evidence that the modernization policy of the 
Hungarian State was not sufficient to explain the decision of Western investors to 
upgrade the profile and strategic position of local firms and give more autonomy to 
Hungarian managers; the socio-political structures and practices of IV itself were 
equally important. Complementing our arguments here, he saw the incorporation of 
distinctive local knowledge as being the main factor behind the emergence of more 
collaborative learning approaches. With this came a commitment from the Western 
head office to the strategic importance of the Hungarian firm and to allowing local 
managers direct influence on central strategic decision-making processes. 
 
Proposition 3: When local senior managers actively accept Western polycentric-
exploratory approaches, there will be sharing of tacit knowledge and deep learning in 
the transnational site. This is likely to result in the construction of genuinely new 
institutional practices and stability based on mutual trust and cooperation. 
 
6.2. Case 6: Imitative transnational order 
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The second case arises from the combination of a Western ethnocentric-exploitative 
orientation and post-socialist passive acceptance. In this scenario, the Western partner 
has only limited interest in developing a stable learning relationship with the local 
partner, focusing on imposing control, via transfer of explicit knowledge and formal 
practices to the transnational site. As an ideal type, passive acceptance of an 
exploitative Western regime reinforces one-way transfer of minimal levels of explicit 
Western knowledge and expedient, superficial learning in the transnational space 
(Child, 2002).  
 
The institutional consequence is a form of transnational order built around the formal 
practices of the Western partner, with some tendencies towards local adaptation 
(Hetrick, 2002). However, it is not likely to last as long as an active acceptance of an 
exploitative approach (case 5). This scenario may be best illustrated with ventures 
based on transnational assembly operations, which are set up by Western partners to 
benefit from cheap East European labor and other costs in a rationalized production 
process. Together with its exploitative mentality, the Western partner’s low level of 
contextual sensitivity is likely to make it blind to any organizational fall-out, such as 
conflicts and resistance, which might be caused by the knowledge and learning 
practices associated with an authoritarian control ideology (Child, 2002; Johnson et 
al., 1996). This scenario is compatible with a short-term imitative order, which, other 
things being equal, has an incipient tendency towards instability – that is, to shift to 
case 7 or even case 8 (see Table 2). 
 
This scenario applies most readily to large Western MNCs seeking cost leadership 
and operating post-Fordist production systems. For example, in Dörrenbächer’s 
(2001) comparative study of German FDI in the Hungarian manufacturing sector, 
German MNCs directly transferred to their Hungarian sites formal knowledge 
developed in Germany. They restricted the autonomy of their Hungarian subsidiaries, 
by withholding a strategic role and making them either miniature replicas or 
rationalized manufacturers. However, Dörrenbächer (2001) concluded that such 
symptoms of exploitative learning were less likely to emerge in those subsidiaries that 
had ‘a strong indigenous management as well as rather strong employee 
representation’.  
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Proposition 4: When local senior managers passively accept Western ethnocentric-
exploitative approaches, controlled amounts of explicit knowledge will be transferred 
and only superficially learned. This is likely to result in the formal imitation of 
foreign practices, but short-term stability may give way to institutional atrophy or 
instability in the longer term. 
 
6.3. Case 8: Transnational battlefields 
The final illustrative scenario refers to the combination of an ethnocentric- 
exploitative Western orientation that is met with active resistance. Such a situation is 
a likely to occur when a post-socialist enterprise, especially one with a strong local 
reputation, is forced into a venture against its will. Local social logics have the 
capacity to contest, adapt and otherwise reshape packages of formal knowledge 
imported by Western partners (Dobosz and Jankowicz, 2002; Jankowicz, 2001; 
Markóczy, 1993). From initial positions of expedient co-operation (case 6) or latent 
resentment (case 7), local managers can slip into outright opposition when their 
expertise is spurned or if they attribute predatory objectives to the Western MNC. 
Following Kristensen and Zeitlin (2001), we might call such a scenario a 
‘transnational battlefield’, in which the transnational site experiences overt conflict 
between logics of action and local resentment over Western dominance.  
 
Exploitative attitudes limit knowledge processes to the transfer of codified and 
technical information, and there are minimal expectations of deep learning in the 
transnational site. Met by absorptive incapacities created by local resistance and 
opposition, the Western knowledge transferred is only weakly copied and diffused. 
Overt conflict and limited learning makes the transnational battlefield highly 
contested and unstable (Dörr and Kessel, 2002). Indeed, this scenario offers a political 
account of venture failure that complements those of Inkpen and Beamish (1997) and 
Hamel (1991), in which the dominant partner uses its asymmetrical advantages to 
destabilize the venture. These latter tendencies may further exacerbate local 
oppositional responses leading to a vicious circle of institutional atrophy within the 
transnational site, eventuating in a collapse of the partnership. 
 
In a study of a German-Czech automotive joint venture, Clark and Soulsby (2003) 
examined the creation, destabilization and dissolution of the alliance. The German 
MNC acted as a “colonial power”, forcing the Czech enterprise to adopt its global 
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practices and preventing local participation in strategic decision-making. This 
ethnocentric-exploitative orientation caused intense resentment and opposition, 
prompting the Czech enterprise to withdraw from the partnership. 
 
Proposition 5: When local senior managers actively resist Western ethnocentric-
exploitative approaches, the limited transfer of explicit knowledge will be 
increasingly resisted in favor of continuing local practices. This is likely to result in 
an overt struggle for control of the transnational site leading to institutional instability, 
crisis and possible collapse. 
 
Each of the eight combinations of Western and post-socialist orientations has different 
prospects and implications in terms of the knowledge transferred, the learning 
undertaken and the microeconomic institutions constructed within the transnational 
social space. The three cases discussed and the dynamics implicit in the typology 
illustrate the range of possible processes and outcomes. 
 
7. Conclusions 
There are strong motives to adopt exploitative learning approaches in strategic 
alliances, for example, because of their more favorable payback schedule (Koza and 
Lewin, 1998; March, 1991). Indeed, it might be suggested that the strong normative, 
regulative and cognitive pressures in transforming societies to adapt Western 
standards (Peng, 2003) might make experimentation and exploration even less 
attractive to local enterprises and managers, for whom copying Western practices is a 
rational route to rapid learning and legitimation (Geppert, 2003). However, in this 
paper we have argued that the process and direction of institution building cannot be 
reduced to passive institution-isomorphic forces. In fact, a reasonable theoretical 
account of institutionalization should be able to explain the ways in which powerful 
social actors have intervened to enact their preferences within the social space of a 
transnational site. Contrary to mainstream international business approaches that tend 
to concentrate on Western power-holders and their capacity to acquire and maintain 
power, we have applied a more interactive approach toward knowledge and learning 
processes in IVs. By putting power and politics at the center of the emergent IV, we 
have not just addressed who gains power and who is left out, but related this to 
emergent institution building in post-socialist IV (Bachrach and Botwinick, 1992). 
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We have argued that relationships between Western and post-socialist companies tend 
to reflect and reinforce the structural asymmetries that characterize the international 
geopolitical and economic context. While such asymmetries offer Western managers 
the potential to create the governance structures and to introduce the ideas and 
practices that they unilaterally prefer, this view grossly understates the complexity 
and variability of the internal socio-political processes in a transnational site. In this 
sense our paper serves to shed some light on the question how managers in post-
socialist contexts have learned how to become and act like members of Western 
dominated ‘commuties of practice’, but in quite different ways. In case 1, we 
discussed the scenario of how and why the local managers become actively involved 
in mutual learning activities. In case 6, learning and knowledge creation was 
interpreted as a rather passive process, and in case 8 we stressed the contested and 
precarious nature of certain learning situtions in post-socialist IVs. 
 
The post-socialist managers’ willingness to adopt Western practices fully when linked 
to ethnocentric-exploitative approaches by Western strategic managers may, within 
the asymmetric conditions of the transformation IV, produce the knowledge, learning 
and institution building outcomes proposed by low context research. However, as we 
have argued, the socio-political process of transnational sites can also take other 
forms, associated with different combinations of Western and post-socialist 
orientations to the international venture. In addition to unilateral knowledge transfer, 
imitative learning and stable, mimetic reproduction of Western practices in the 
transnational site, it is possible to explain cases where transferred knowledge has been 
repelled and institutions are built on indigenous resources with varying degrees of 
hostility to the MNC partner and of institutional instability within the transnational 
site. Equally, within the advocated framework, we can understand processes of 
genuinely mutual knowledge exchange, deep learning of tacit knowledge and stable, 
enduring institution building through the combination and recombination of new ideas 
and old practices from both partners.  
 
The theoretical framework developed in this paper goes some way toward 
comprehending this diversity, complexity and precariousness of institutional change. 
If, as we argue, the macroeconomic transformation is in some way the aggregated 
product of these diverse microeconomic transformations, it is not surprising that the 
nature and degree of transformation has varied from country to country, locality to 
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locality, industry to industry and, ultimately, organization to organization. It is true 
that the conceptual linchpins of the framework need further elaboration based on 
empirical observation. Research on the emprirical variations in strategic and 
management orientations within a multicultural transnational site is an important first 
step. More case study work would allow us to deepen our grasp of how power 
holders’ orientations are enacted as strategic choices within the politics of asymmetric 
relations, hence capturing the internal dynamics of asymmetric relations in IVs over 
time. 
 
We think that this form of argument has particular relevance beyond the post-socialist 
context in setting a research agenda for international business in ‘emerging’ market 
economies, such as Brazil, China, Mexico and Turkey. As with early research in the 
post-socialist context, maintream research in emerging economies seems to have 
adopted a structuralist and positivist perspective (see, for example, the Journal of 
International Business Studies’ recent Call for Papers on ‘International expansion of 
emerging market businesses’). Learning from research experiences in post-socialist 
Europe may hasten a more complex and refined understanding of microeconomic 
insitutional development in transnational sites in emerging economies.  
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Table 1 
Combined strategic orientations in asymmetric transnational alliances 
Post-socialist orientations Western 
strategic 
orientations 
Active 
acceptance 
Passive 
acceptance 
Passive non-
conformity 
Active 
opposition 
Polycentric-
Exploratory 
1 2 3 4 
Ethnocentric-
exploitative 
5 6 7 8 
The focus of the discussion of the paper is on the cases printed in bold 
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Table 2 
The Eight Cases 
Case Partner orientations Patterns of knowledge and learning Institution building (transformation) processes and outcomes 
Polycentric-
exploratory 
1. 
Active acceptance 
Western sharing of explicit and tacit 
knowledge; deep mutual learning 
Assimilative transnational order: stable, adaptive and incremental 
transformation based on foreign and local values. Long term 
stability based on mutual trust. Genuinely new institutions 
Polycentric-
exploratory  
2. 
Expedient 
conformity 
Western desire to share explicit and 
tacit knowledge; initial local reticence 
and suspicion, but learning gets deeper 
Incipient transnational order: initially slow institution building, as 
Western ideas are affected by mild local path dependency; possible 
tendency to Case 1 if local trust is built through negotiating 
differences, leading to longer term stability and mutually 
constructed new practices 
Polycentric-
exploratory  
3. 
Passive non-
conformity 
Western desire to share explicit and 
tacit knowledge, but possible 
withdrawal with non-cooperation; 
limited and shallow learning, especially 
in short term 
Incipient transnational disorder: Like 2, but less predictable. 
Outcome depends of whether (and how quickly) the local partner 
responds to foreign partner’s aims and how tolerant/patient the 
foreign partner is; reproduction of local practices may lead to 
withdrawal of foreign partner, a strategic redefinition of IV and/or a 
shift to Case 4  
Polycentric-
exploratory  
4. 
Active opposition 
Western desire to share explicit and 
tacit knowledge, but likely withdrawal 
with local opposition; local resistance to 
sharing and learning 
Transnational disorder: local opposition to foreign strategic aims is 
manifested in the everyday reproduction of historical local practices 
and restricted development of new combined practices. Significant 
institution building is doomed to failure, and Western partner may 
resort to exploitation-ethnocentrism 
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Case Partner orientations Patterns of knowledge and learning Institution building (transformation) processes and outcomes 
Ethnocentric- 
exploitation 
5. 
Active acceptance 
Western partner strongly controls and 
minimizes knowledge transfer and is 
uninterested in local knowledge; local 
partner learns the shallow knowledge on 
offer 
Imitative transnational order: direct copying of Western practices 
into IV, willingly enacted by local partners. Minimal influence of 
local know-how may lead to weak institutional fit with local 
environment and hence a frail institutional order 
Ethnocentric- 
exploitation  
6. 
Expedient 
conformity 
Western partner strongly controls and 
minimizes knowledge transfer and is 
uninterested in local knowledge; 
reluctant learning of even codified 
knowledge 
Short-term imitative transnational order: IV mimics formal 
structures and practices of foreign partner, but local partner may 
filter imported ideas through past practices. Short-term mutual 
commitment to superficial institution building builds instability 
and/or atrophy into the transnational site; possible shift to Case 5 or 
Case 7 
Ethnocentric- 
exploitation  
7. 
Passive non-
conformity 
Western partner controls and minimizes 
knowledge transfer and is uninterested in 
local knowledge; general antipathy to 
foreign ideas minimizes learning on site 
in favor of local ways 
Incipient transnational battlefield: local unwillingness to cooperate 
but lack of active resistance can lead to some short-term installation 
of formal structures but also minimize the scope and depth of 
institution building. Possible Western resort to domination can 
create instability and movement towards Case 8 
Ethnocentric- 
exploitation  
8. 
Active opposition 
Western partner strongly controls and 
minimizes knowledge transfer and is 
uninterested in local knowledge; local 
partner resists acquiring the minimal 
knowledge on offer and asserts own 
practices 
Transnational battlefield: lack of any interest in knowledge sharing 
results in a battle of wills, each trying to control the other. Could 
lead to a vicious circle of dysfunctional control, as Western partner 
asserts ‘right’ to achieve its ends and local partner resists even more 
strongly. Institutional outcomes would include instability, crisis and 
collapse 
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Structural 
asymmetry
Variations in partners’ 
orientations to the IV
Patterns of knowledge 
acquisition and 
management learning
Institution-building 
processes and 
outcomes
Figure 1: Socio-political processes, knowledge and institution building
 
